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and 57 female) used a six-point 
Likert scale to rank their pre-in-
structional agreement with eight 
statements about information se-
curity beliefs:
World Wide Web security is im-•	
portant for business.
World Wide Web security is •	
important for general computer 
users.
We must pay attention to securi-•	
ty issues when surfing the World 
Wide Web.
When we use Internet banking •	
services, we should make sure 
the connection is SSL-enabled.
We must install and enable anti-•	
virus software.
We must update antivirus soft-•	
ware regularly.
We must scan our computers for •	
viruses regularly.
We must always enable firewall •	
protection.
The participants then attended a 
lecture covering Web security, 
computer safety, and network sec-
urity. One version of the lecture 
took a conceptual change teaching 
approach, with anomalous data 
in security presented to the 
participants (the experimental 
condition), and a different version 
didn’t (the control condition). In 
particular, the instructor inten-
tionally guided the experimental 
group to create conceptual con-
flicts in their beliefs about net-
work data confidentiality. This 
was a formal experimental design 
in which students in both the 
who primarily just use computer 
networks and information systems 
rather than display expertise in the 
underlying technology.1 
In the last issue,2 we de-
scribed conceptual change and its 
pedagogical application. In this 
issue, we take the discussion one 
step further by describing a real-
life case study: the implementation 
of a conceptual change pedagogy 
in security awareness education 
for nonengineering undergradu-
ates at the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong.
Background
The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong launched its Student Infor-
mation Technology Competency 
Program in 1999. It requires all 
students to attend and pass an in-
formation technology proficiency 
test before graduation. This test 
consists of eight sections, includ-
ing one about information security 
that assesses students’ knowledge 
about various concepts, as well as 
their ability to manipulate anti-
virus software. To promote secu-
rity awareness in students’ daily 
computer usage and to help them 
pass the test, the university offers 
multiple sessions of a three-hour 
training class. In this class, students 
learn various concepts related to 
information security, including 
computer viruses, electronic com-
munication security, computer 
safety, Web security, and public-
key infrastructures.
Overview of  
the Experiment
To learn whether conceptual 
change pedagogy is effective in 
information security awareness 
education, we performed an ex-
periment in four sessions from 
September 2007 to June 2008. 
Each class had 20 to 30 students; 
we used two sessions as the control 
group and the other two as the ex-
perimental group.
We derived our experiment’s 
design from Clark Chinn and 
Betina Malhotra’s work,3 which 
used anomalous data such as the 
same falling speed of heavy and 
light objects and the identical 
readings of two thermometers (one 
wrapped in wool and the other 
not) to foster conceptual change in 
fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-graders 
attending science classes. In our 
experiment, 102 students (45 male 
I
n educational psychology, conceptual change is a proc-
ess that revises a student’s understanding of a topic in 
response to new information. Conceptual change ped-
agogy is particularly effective for security awareness 
education because instructors must deliver concepts to people
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experimental group (55 people) 
and the control group (47 people) 
answered identical questionnaires 
consisting of eight questions in 
security awareness both before 
and after the lecture. Our hypoth-
esis was that if conceptual change 
occurred, the participants would 
indicate a different level of agree-
ment with the statements before 
and after the lecture. Furthermore, 
if such change were effective, the 
level of agreement with the state-
ments should increase.
Creating  
Conceptual Conflicts
To reveal participants’ preconcep-
tions in daily security issues and 
encourage them to discuss and 
evaluate such preconceptions, we 
guided the experimental group’s 
participants to predict and observe 
an event that demonstrated the 
network data confidentiality of 
popular webmail services—specif-
ically, they observed a demonstra-
tion of packet sniffing in a popular 
webmail application. To create the 
conceptual conflict, the instructor 
first accessed the webmail login 
page, typed in a username and 
password, and then showed the 
corresponding “sniffed” network 
packets. This helped the students 
see that all packet payloads were 
encrypted (because the webmail 
login page was SSL-protected), 
so we asked the participants a 
predictive question (Q1): “When 
we send and receive emails via 
[the webmail application, name 
of service provider removed], it’s 
possible for eavesdroppers to read 
the messages’ content. Is this true? 
(yes, no, I don’t know).”
The instructor then introduced 
some core conceptual change 
principles to effect fundamen-
tal changes:4 she first discussed 
the participants’ preconceptions 
and agreed that most computer 
users expect an email message’s 
contents to be encrypted, but 
she pointed out that there were 
exceptions. Next, the instructor 
created conceptual conflicts by 
demonstrating that the network 
traffic payloads of a few popular 
webmail services aren’t, in fact, 
entirely encrypted. Specifically, 
she showed the participants that 
parts of the webmail service’s 
Web site aren’t SSL-protected and 
that they could see a message’s 
contents in plain text (see Figure 
1). This experiment proves that 
we can use such a demonstration 
as anomalous data for fostering 
conceptual change. 
After the packet-sniffing dem-
onstration, we asked the ex-
perimental group participants to 
answer Q1 again (for clarity, we 
call this Q2 in the remainder of 
the article). 
For the control group, the in-
structor demonstrated network 
sniffing and directly explained to 
students that eavesdroppers can 
read Web contents not protected 
by SSL encryption. She demon-
strated packet sniffing on several 
SSL-protected Web sites as well 
as several without SSL protection 
and compared the differences. 
However, the instructor didn’t 
explicitly create conceptual con-
flicts. At the end of the lecture, 
we asked both groups to again 
rank their responses to our initial 
eight statements. 
When asked Q1, 37 experi-
mental group participants (67.27 
percent) said that eavesdroppers 
couldn’t read email content, and 
8 (14.55 percent) indicated that 
they didn’t know the answer; only 
10 (18.18 percent) said that email 
content could be read. This shows 
that most participants mistakenly 
believed that email content is kept 
confidential in network transmis-
sions. Q2 tested the participants 
after observing the demonstra-
tion—41 (74.55 percent) said that 
email content could be read, 8 
(14.55 percent) said that the con-
tents were unreadable, and 6 
(10.91 percent) didn’t know.
C ynthia E. Irvine is a professor of computer science at the US Naval Postgraduate School. Her research interests include high-assurance trustworthy systems, hardware-based se-
curity support, multilevel security, and cybersecurity education. Irvine has a PhD in astronomy 
from Case Western Reserve University. She is a member of the IEEE, the IEEE Computer Soci-
ety, the ACM, and the Astronomical Society of the Pacific. Contact her at irvine@nps.edu.
New Department Editor
(a)
“This is a secret message and is confidential!”
(b)
Figure 1. Webmail security. As demonstrated from an experiment performed in December 
2007, (a) the webmail interface appears secure, but (b) a network analyzer can display packet 
contents in plain text.
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We further classified those who 
at first predicted email content 
couldn’t be read but saw later that, 
in fact, the reverse is true as the 
subgroup that observed anomalous 
data. Among the 55 experimental 
group participants, 32 of them fell 
into this category.
The Experimental 
Condition 
A Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.818 
indicates that our initial set of eight 
statements was a reliable instru-
ment for measuring participants’ 
preconceptions about information 
security. Table 1 shows the mean 
scores for each group’s pre- and 
post-test results.
We applied analysis of cova-
riance (Ancova) to the data to 
study the experiment’s impact on 
the average post-test score. In Ta-
bles 2 and 3, we adopted standard 
statistical notations in which p 
and Sig. denote the probability 
that the two groups are the same, 
df denotes the degree of freedom, 
and the F-ratio reflects whether 
the two comparing groups are 
approximately equal. Two equal 
groups give an F-ratio of value 1. 
Table 2 shows the results on both 
pre- and post-test results where 
the group is the fixed variable 
(experimental = 55, control = 
47). Although the experimental 
group exhibited a greater differ-
ence between the pre- and post-
test scores than the control group 
(0.344 for experimental group 
and 0.202 for control group, re-
spectively), it isn’t statistically 
significant (p > 0.1). 
We further analyzed the ex-
perimental group results to de-
termine the impact of whether 
the participant had observed 
anomalous data. Table 3 presents 
an Ancova on pre- and posttest 
results, where the fixed variable is 
whether the participant observed 
anomalous data (not observed 
= 23, observed = 32). Here, 
there is a significant difference (p 
< 0.05).
O ur findings show that concep-tual change pedagogy, an ap-
proach proven effective in science 
education, is also effective in secu-
rity awareness training for nonen-
gineering undergraduates. The set 
of eight statements tested quanti-
tatively how well the participants 
could transfer their learning from 
the security awareness training 
class to various aspects of informa-
tion security practices. Our results 
showed that the mean post-test 
scores were higher than the mean 
pre-test scores in both the experi-
mental and control groups (Table 
1), but the difference between 
them wasn’t statistically signifi-
cant (Table 2). However, when we 
added the subgroup that observed 
the anomalous data and compared 
their scores with those who hadn’t, 
we found a significant difference 
(Table 3). This suggests that con-
ceptual change fostered by anom-
alous data is effective in teaching 
information security awareness, 
and that participants could transfer 
Table 1. Mean scores for each group before and after the experiment.
ExpEriMEnTal (N = 55) ExpEriMEnTal subgroup; 
obsErvEd anoMalous 
daTa (N = 32)
ConTrol (N = 47)
prE-TEsT posT-TEsT prE-TEsT posT-TEsT prE-TEsT posT-TEsT
World Wide Web security is im-
portant for business
4.845 5.064 4.844 5.375 4.840 5.011
World Wide Web security is 
important for general computer 
users
4.936 5.173 4.938 5.344 4.968 5.031
We must pay attention to security 
issues when surfing the World 
Wide Web
4.736 5.009 4.750 5.219 4.734 4.913
When we use Internet banking 
services, we should make sure the 
connection is SSL-enabled
4.518 5.074 4.438 5.313 4.565 4.819
We must install and enable anti-
virus software
4.700 5.027 4.625 5.219 4.717 4.926
We must update antivirus soft-
ware regularly
4.536 4.955 4.438 5.125 4.543 4.734
We must scan our computers for 
viruses regularly
4.630 4.955 4.625 5.063 4.628 4.968
We must always enable firewall 
protection
4.611 5.009 4.531 5.156 4.628 4.840
Overall average 4.689 5.033 4.648 5.227 4.703 4.905
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their new perceptions about web-
mail services’ confidentiality to a 
range of daily security practices.
Indeed, according to Clark 
Chinn and William Brewer,1 ob-
serving anomalies can cause sub-
jects to substantially reconsider 
their existing preconceptions and 
thus promote conceptual change. In 
our experiment, despite the explicit 
demonstration and explanations, a 
minority of participants (8 out of 
55, or 14.55 percent) reported that 
a third party couldn’t read email 
content. These participants might 
have either rejected the anomaly 
or prevented the new information 
from conflicting with their origi-
nal preconceptions. Further inves-
tigations could help us modify our 
teaching to encourage the obser-
vation of anomalous data so as to 
best implement conceptual change 
as a tool in teaching information 
security. Overall, we conclude 
that conceptual change fostered 
by anomalous data is an effective 
pedagogy for security awareness. 
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Table 2. statistical test of differences between experimental group and control group.*
varianCE sourCE suMs of squarEs df MEan squarE f-raTio sig.
Regression .424 1 .424 .523 .417
Residual error 80.390 99 .812
Total 2609.856 55
*Sig. denotes probability that the two groups are the same, df denotes the degree of freedom, and F-ratio reflects whether the two comparing groups are 
approximately equal.
Table 3. statistical test of differences between experimental group participants who observed 
anomalous data and those who didn’t.*
varianCE sourCE suMs of squarEs df MEan squarE f-raTio sig.
Regression 3.239 1 3.239 4.681 .035
Residual error 35.983 52 .692
Total 1434.626 55
*Sig. denotes probability that the two groups are the same, df denotes the degree of freedom, and F-ratio reflects whether the two comparing groups are 
approximately equal.
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